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Introductory
The Reverend F .A . Ramseyer was probably one of the most remarkable 
missionaries who ever worked on the Gold Coast and Ashanti (modern Ghana).
He founded the Basel (Presbyterian) Church in Kumasi which bears his name.
There is a 'Ramseyer House' in Ashanti's leading Secondary School, Prempeh 
College, at Kumasi, which is a joint enterprise of the Methodist and Presbyterian 
Churches of Ghana. Ramseyer is immortalized in the book he wrote with his 
fellow captive, S .J . Kuhne ,  ^ of their captiv ity  in Kumasi, the Ashanti capital 
(1869-1874), while the Ashanti still remember him in the persistent legend that 
his captors go no atopre that is to say, meted to him the extreme punishment of 
forcing him to dance while carrying the large fontomfrom drum. That legend is 
only a measure of his sufferings as a captive and prisoner in Kumasi. Nowhere 
in his book does Ramseyer mention this extreme punishment which was given only 
to the greatest criminal offenders.
I am concerned here with the part that Ramseyer played in the campaign 
for the Gold Coast Government to take over Ashanti in the early eighteen- 
nineties. But it is certain that to understand his 'concern' about the Ashanti, 
a few words about his encounter with them and his life  among them at Kumasi, 
as w ell as the background to the campaign, are necessary.
Ramseyer in C aptivity (1869-1874)
Ramseyer had at first not intended a missionary sojourn in Ashanti. In 
December 1868 he went with his wife and child to Anum in the present-day 
Volta Region of Ghana. S .J . Kuhne , his fellow  captive and co-author joined 
him at the mission as a trader in cotton, an ac tiv ity  which was part o f, and a 
means o f, financing the mission. Kuhne had hardly settled down when an Ashanti 
army under Adu Bofo, the Gyasehene of Kumasi, arrived in the district as the
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a llies  of the Akwamu and the A n lo .
The Ramseyer fam ily and Kuhne were taken captive fo r reasons that 
only emerge as the ir story unfolds. The Ashanti were obviously suspicious 
that the mission was sealing arms and ammunition to the enemies of the 
Akwamu and the Anlo; they hoped for substantial ransom from the British 
C olonial authorities;"^ they wanted to use Ramseyer and company as 
diplom atic counters.0 M eanw hile the mission's bewilderment concerning 
the reasons for their capture and the Ashanti o ffic ia ls ' skill in dangling before 
them hopes o f an early  release contributed a good deal to their mental anguish.
A fte r they had been presented to Adu Bofo, he sent them, together with 
the loot from the mission, under a minor w a r-c a p ta in , 'Ageana', (Agyena) to 
Kumasi. The track was d iffic u lt between Anum and Kwahu over the Volta  
River and the Kwahu mountains. ^ The Ramseyer Family and Kuhne were
obliged to march at the pace of the Ashanti fighting man and generally live
the latter's l i fe .  This was a hard life  as Ramseyer himself found out:
"The Ashantees, being a hardy race inured from youth 
to severest s im p lic ity , are able to march day a fte r day 
at a q u ick , steady pace w ith intervals of rest, and a
modicum of food. They lie  down to sound sleep at n ight,
a fte r a light supper o f corn, waking refreshed_and 
strengthened to resume their way at sunrise.
Their food supply consisted o f a breakfast of boiled yam and a supper of soup wit 
m aize and a lit t le  m eat.^  They only fared better when the army forayed in the 
heavier populated and more intensely cu ltivated  areas, such as Kwahu and the 
eastern districts o f Ashanti. Besides hunger and thirst and weariness from the 
march, there was the conduct o f A gyena, the o ffic e r-in -c h a rg e  o f the prisoners 
who made no distinctions among his prisoners of w ar and seemed to demonstrate 
this in a practical manner to Ramseyer and his companions.
Conditions of life  got better when they arrived within the borders of 
Ashanti itse lf. The tracks were b e tte r, apparently, from frequent use:
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"As we approached Ashantee proper, we were struck by the 
increasing fe rtility  of the w ell-w atered country. In the 
vic in ity  of every important place the roads were good, 
and sometimes for miles together suitable for traffic?
The chiefs, priests of the local deities and the people of the districts of Kwahu, 
A g o g o , Efiduase and Dwabin through which the route lay showed great kindness 
to  the missionaries. Agyena, the o fficer, was superseded by a higher officer 
who had instructions from the King of Ashanti to treat his prisoners b e t te r .^
Meanwhile in Kwahu Ramseyer's child had died from fever consequent on 
the long march and lack of good nourishment. Ramseyer's comment on this is 
significant:
'O h , how hard it was to suppress the bitter feelings 
against those who had murdered this innocent babe by 
their cruelty .' ^
Life in Kumasi was not too bad and was even interesting. The missionaries 
lived on an average allowance of 9 dollars given to them every fortnight when 
the Ashantihene celebrated the Little and Great Adai festivals. There were, in 
addition, occasional gifts of sheep and food supplies. Life was brightened by 
the spectacles offered by the ritual dances during these festivals which were 
sometimes attended by the chiefs of the principal Ashanti divisions. They were 
lucky to fall in with the French trader, M . Bonnat, who looked upon his lot as 
a prisoner with equanimity and turned his hands to practical amelioration of 
their conditions. He improved the prisoners' furniture and urged them to occupy 
themselves by cultivating farms. They were no more under the supervision of 
the hard Agyena. They were befriended by the Ashantihene's cousin, Prince 
Ansah, who had been educated in England at the British Government's expense 
and now acted as the unofficial Ashanti ambassador at Cape Coast, the colonial 
governor's residence. They were now in touch with friends both on the Gold 
Coast and in Europe who wrote to them, sent them gifts and worked for their 
release.
It would be false, however, to say that the missionaries were happy at 
Kumasi. Their life  was harrassed by thiefs and hangers-on who took off the major 
parts of gifts from the king. They had a  d is ta ste  for the more rigorous aspects of
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Ashanti rituals of kingship and punishment. They were horrified by the 
consequences of Ashanti warfare such as the treatment of war-prisoners. They 
were worried about 'human sacrifices' though in their own words, the 'victims' 
were ‘mostly c r im in a ls .'^  There were minor irritations like the blasphemies 
of the Ashanti; one A frifa ,for example, declared that the Ashantihene was God. 
Finally K arikari, the Ashantihene, was suddenly seized by the idee that his 
prisoners, Fante, Anum, and the Europeans, should pay for their keep by 
building him a European-style house and Ramseyer was obliged to act as his 
foreman of works.  ^^
Uncertainty about their release was the straw that broke the camel's back. 
On their arrival in Kumasi, they were told that their stay there would w ait upon 
the arrival of Adu Bofo who had taken them captive. The King declared he could 
do nothing for them,for
'According to the laws of the Ashantee country, the 
King had no power to set prisoners at liberty till 
the general who captured them (returned)' .14
When he returned,Adu Bofo wanted an impossibly large ransom, a thousand 
peredwane (£8,000) for the king end £6 ,480  for h im s e lf.^  When pressed by 
the (Governor of the Gold Coast, the Ashanti released them for a £1 ,000  ransom, 
they reached Fomena only to be dragged back to Kumasi because the Ashanti 
feared some trickery on the part of the Gold Coast Government,
In the light of these experiences, it was natural that Rqmseyer and his 
companions should bear the Ashanti a grudge. As they said:
'We had long had d ifficu lty  in cherishing any love for 
the Ashantees, now the measure of their blindness seemed 
full and punishment d e s e rv e d .'^
It was also natural that they should wring their hands with delight at the news 
of imminent invasion of Ashanti by British forces under Sir Garnet Wolseley and 
see in it God's judgment and chastisement of those who had trifled with His 
servants. Ramseyer and Kuhne wrote:
‘We felt that Ashantee would have to be humbled, for 
thousands of murdered victims were crying to heaven.
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while we who so gladly would have brought peace, must 
be the means of bringing misfortune upon this blinded 
land . '1 7
The missionaries were released at the approach of Wolseley's forces and 
lived to see the humiliation of Ashanti The core of the Ashanti 'empire' 
was, however, left to itself to engage in the old activities a lbeit on a minor 
scale, and thus give an opportunity to Ramseyer to contribute to its final 
dow nfall.
Background to Ramseyer's campaign, 1874-1889
%
The 1873-74 invasion of Ashanti struck a fatal blow to the kingdom.
Both Its economic and political effects were overwhelming and it is remarkable 
that the kingdom lasted over the new two decades. Here we can only sketch 
the effects of the in v a s io n .^
Economically, the king's coffers were exhausted. Amankwatia's adventures 
in the Gold Coast Protectorate immediately before the invasion cost the country 
6 ,000  petedwane nearly £48 ,000  in arms and ammunition .20 The financial 
consequence of this was that the King, Karikari was compelled to have an 
unauthorized recourse to the national treasures in the Bantama Mausoleum which 
was one of the reasons for his destoolment after the war.
The impoverishment of the Ashantihene also led to an increase in indirect 
taxation in the time of King Mensah Bonsu. Court fines and tolls in transit were 
abnormally increased. The first contributed to the revolts in Bekwai, Kokofu and 
M anso-Nkwanta, the southern districts of central Ashanti and the second to 
Nkoranza's disaffection towards Kumasi.
P o litica lly , the defeat of the army and the destruction of Kumasi had a 
shattering effect on the Ashanti who had a ll along believed that whatever they 
did the British would not go to K u m as i.^  The result of it a ll is what may be 
called political anomie, a loss of certainty about their ultimate political values. 
The Ashanti questioned whether the Ash i Union itself was any longer necessary 
and saw in the colonial government at < ape Coast an alternative to the supreme 
superordinate authority of the Golden Stool of Ashanti.
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O f this anomie, the secessionist movements and the succession disputes 
which culminated in the c iv il wars (1882-83 . 1884-85, 1888-89) were symptoms. 
A safo-A dje i, the regent-chief of Juabin told the Governor of the Gold C o a s t  
after the Kumasi-Juabin war of 1875 that 'everyone thought Ashantee was broken 
and that they might do what they liked and if anyone wished to get away from 
Ashantee they would be assisted. '^3 |t seemed clear to the consistituent c h ie f- 
doms of the Ashanti Union that the British were interested in, and would assist, 
the frangmentation of the Union. So it was that the chiefs who contemplated 
secession invariably notified the governor of their intention to seek protection 
under the colonial government.
The invasion of Ashanti had the same effect on the erstwhile provinces 
and tributaries of Ashanti. In the east, Atebubu and her Brong neighbours,
Salaga and Dagomba, and in the west, Gyaman and Takyiman took their chance 
to throw off the Ashanti y o k e .^  And as in the case of Asafo-Adjei of Juabin, 
they a ll saw the colonial government as their ultimate protector. As a matter 
of urgent defence, they formed, in both the east and west, tribal confederations 
which were defensive anti-Ashanti o rg an iza tio n s .^
The colonial government was at first interested not in political rule of 
these territories but only in their trade: its concern was to encourage increasing 
trade between them and the coast, to open new trade routes which would skirt 
Ashanti and thus break the monopoly of Ashanti entrepreneurs of the North-South  
trade which had^before 1874, been supported by Ashanti m ilitary and political 
domination of the area. In 1876 and 1881 the colonial government sent Special 
Commissioners, Gouldsbury and Lonsdale respectively to the northern districts 
to 'sell' the advantages of trade with the south to the chiefs and peoples. To the 
latter, however, these visits meant that the 'conqueror' of Ashanti concurred in 
their rebellious postures.^
Between 1875 and 1889, the Ashanti were prevented from attempting a re­
conquest of these territories by their c iv il wars which paralysed the political and 
mobilizing machinery. By 1889, however, Prempeh (the successor to Kwaku Dua 1' 
1888) who had imposed a semblance of peace after driving the adherents of his 
riva l-candidate , Atwereboanah, to Atebubu and the British Protectorate, fe lt 
strong enough to attempt a consolidation po licy , to recover some of his lost ^
territorial legacy, including Nkoranza, Atebubi and the neighbouring chiefdoms. 
A further object was to re-open the trade roytes to Salaga which had been closed 
by the Eastern Brong people after 1874, as a gesture of defiance towards Ashanti.
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By 1889, the co lon ia l government had stumbled on to the fact that 
trade would not flourish if  Ashanti remained in her troubled states. The 
imperial designs of the colon ia l government had more or less crysta llized: 
to ensure smooth and prosperous trade between the Gold Coast and the in terior 
a certain measure of p o lit ica l con tro l, d irect or ind irec t, over the peoples 
concerned was necessary. The government realized that the time was fast 
approaching when Ashanti itse lf would have to be brought w ith in  the colonial 
framework. Thus it was necessary to prevent Prempeh's po licy of consolidation 
from succeeding. |n 1889, Brandford Griffith, the acting governor started the policy 
of weakening Ashanti further by g iv ing  encouragement to the dissident chiefs 
of Mampong and Nsuta who had taken refuge in Atebubu after their war w ith 
Prempeh's adherents: he sent, a fte r representations from Ramseyer, then 
stationed at A b e tif i,  a guard of constabularly to convey the chiefs to settle 
in the Protectorate and he warned the Ashantihene against attempts to recover 
his lost northern te r r ito r ie s .^  Hodgson was only prevented from adding 
territories to the Protectorate by the British Government who did not want furthei 
responsibilities on the C old  Coast and in 1891 rebuked Hodgson's inv ita tion  to 
Ashanti to apply for membership of the protectorate as being ultra vires and 
contrary to British pal icy . ^0 By 1890, however, Hodgson had already secured 
a jumping-board for further expansion in the hinterland and placed a lim ita tion  
on Ashanti consolidation ambitions by signing a treaty o f protection w ith Atebubu 
in November, 1890. It was this treaty which brought about the despatch of a 
British Expeditionary force to Atebubu late in 1893 and Ramseyer's campaign for 
the establishment o f British rule in Ashanti.
The Atebubu A ffa ir and Ramseyer's Campaign (1893-94)
It was the Ashanti-Nkoranza war of 1892-1893 which brought about what
I ca ll the 'Atebubu A ffa ir ',  that is, the threatened confrontation between Ashanti 
and British forces in Atebubu in 1893.
In 1888, Prempeh, the Ashantihene, had reasons to doubt the a llegiance 
o f Opoku, the Nkoranzahene, who had been a consistent supporter o f the late 
King Karikari and seemed to have some d ifficu ltie s  in transferring his a llegiance 
to his successors. Opoku consistently refused to go to Kumasi to swear a llegiance 
to Prempeh when the la tte r became Ashantihene in 1888. When Prempeh asked 
for the formal oath of a ileg ian ce , Opoku demurred and extricated himself from
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ci de lica te  situation by pledging himself to recover the Eastern Brong territories 
for A shan ti.
Opoku died in 1891 whereupon Prempeh called upon his successor, Kori 
Fua, to swear the a llegiance which Opoku had refused. Fua refused, and, 
an tic ipa ting  an Ashanti a ttack , applied to his neighbours, including Krachi, Mo, 
(north o f Kintampo) and Atebubu for help Atebuhu sent a token force o f th irty  
gun-men to the aid o f Nkoranza but represented this to Ferguson, the Gold Coast 
Government's representative, as meant to protect his borders against the Ashanti 
since the Treaty o f Projection signed w ith the colon ia l government forbade Atebubu 
to go to war w ithout prior reference to the Governor. The th irty  aun-m°n qave 
the Ashanti an excuse to encamp in the Atebubu d is tr ic t. 1
Nkoranza won tne first engagement but were decisively beaten by the 
Ashanti w ith a bigger army, composed of men from the Ashanti districts of Mampong, 
Nsuta, Abesim, O ffinso, Kumawu, Kwaman, Ejisu, Agogo and Asokore and a few 
from the Juabin people at Konongo. The Nkoranzahene fled w ith this army to 
Atebubu and then to Wiase, a neighbouring d is tr ic t. The flig h t to Wiase brought in 
pursuit the Ashanti who encamped near Abease to await the orders o f the Ashanti- 
hene on whether to retire or execute the promises o f the Ashanti general who is 
said to have sworn at the start o f the war:
"I w il l proceed to Nkoranza or wherever the king of 
Nkoranza may be and bring him to you. I w il l v is it 
Brumasi /"n o rth  o f Abease~7; I w il l take my breast­
plates from the kings of Prang and Y e ji and Guan 
(northern and eastern neighbours o f A tebubu). I w ill 
encamp at Atebubu where the shady trees w ill give 
shelter to my troops and on my return, I w il l bring 
Atebubu, Nkoranza and a ll the Brong nation w ith me 
to you as part o f your kingdom by conquest. "32
Whether Amankwatia's oath was in earnest or just heady rhetoric, Ashanti aims in 
the area were frustrated by the presence at Atebubu o f co lon ia l troops under Sir 
Francis Scott.
In 1893 reports reaching the Governor that the Ashanti Intended to attack 
Atebubu a fte r the ir campaign in Nkoranza ana requests by Atebubu for m ilita ry
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protection led he Governor to send Ferguson to the borders of Atebubu and 
Nkoranza to spy on the movements of the Ashanti army, and, to request from 
the Secretary of State, permission to send a detachment of Hausa Constabulary 
to make a demonstration with the 'Maxim guns' and thus frighten off the Ashanti 
from Atebubu .^3 Permission was granted and the Inspector-General of the 
Gold Coast Constabularly, Sir Francis Scott, was sent up with a staff and men 
numbering 300 only to discover that the Ashanti had decamped, certainly from 
fear of an encounter with the British forces. The Ashanti encampment had been 
a test of the seriousness with which the colonial government regarded their 
protecting duties. The arrival of Scott, following in the wake of Ferguson, who 
had spoken to Ashanti spies, convinced them of the consequences that would 
attend an attack on Atebubu* The British would have seized Ashanti earlier 
than 1896.
The timely withdrawal of the Ashanti army produced some sort of an anti­
climax and the episode was turned into an opportunity for various groups to renew 
their clamours for a final solution to the Ashanti question, that is, for forcible 
Inclusion of Ashanti in the British Protectorate. O f the various voices, perhaps, 
the most clamorous was that of the Reverend Ramseyer.
Already in 1889 Ramseyer, who was then stationed at the Basel Mission at 
Abetifi in Kwahu, the border territory between eastern Ashanti and the eastern 
portion of the Gold Coast Protectorate, had assumed the role of an intermediary 
between dissident Ashanti chiefs and the Governor of the Gold Coast. Ramseyer 
Informed the latter that he had received g message from the Nsutahene asking for 
permission to settle in the Protectorate. An officer, Badger, was accordingly 
sent to Atebubu only to be informed by the Nsutahene that he had not sent any 
message to Ramseyer and that he had no desire to seek refuge on the Gold C o a s t . ^5
Ramseyer also assumed the role of a spy on Ashanti making it his business 
to report on those of her activities which he knew would antagonize the Governor 
against her. Thys he found It significant to report to the Governor that the Ashanti­
hene had sent a message to the Kwahu chiefs asking them not to receive any of 
the defeated Mamponp people in K w a h u . 36
Ramseyer's opportunity, however, came with the Atebubu episode. The 
Governor acknowledged and made use of his role as a spy. He urged him on the 
eve of Ferguson's departure to organize a spy-network on the Ashanti, to give
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every assistance to Ferguson and 'to glean a ll possible information w ith regard 
to affa irs in Ashanti and to acquaint me w ith i t / ^
Ramseyer was quick to realize the po ten tia lity  of the expedition to 
Atebubu as a means for the fina l overthrow of Ashanti. W riting to the Governor 
at the start o f the exped ition , he 're jo ice d 1 at the steps that were being taken 
towards Ashanti; he hoped that the 'decisive steps' would now be taken and this 
was to bring Ashanti under the British flag . Me alleged that the Juabin people 
le ft at Konongo were 'begging' to be taken into the Protectorate and that his 
fe llow  missionaries at A b e tifi wanted the imposition o f British rule upon Ashanti.
He reminded the Governor o f what he regarded as justifiab le  reasons or excuses 
for taking over Ashanti:
"The more as it  can be done w ithout a single shot being 
fire d . The war indemnity /""imposed by Sir Garnet 
Wolseley by Treaty in 187? /  has not been paid and the 
Ashantees are g iv ing  every year trouble to the English 
Government, arid having now forced the Governor to such 
expenses /"towards the Atebubu e xp e d itio n "/ there are 
indeed reasons and ground enough to te ll tTiem 'you are 
under our ju risd ic tion ! "
There was a fina l hysterical outburst: 'For humanity's sake, for the welfare of the
country, for the real peace of a ll the tribes o f the Gold Coast and for the benefit 
o f the spreading o f the word of Salvation which must be brought to all nations, we 
the missionaries o f A b e tifi take the libe rty  to ask the British Government to do the 
fin ishing stroke and bring Kumase and a ll that is remaining of Ashantee under the 
British F la g . '^  He also wrote to Scott, the leader o f the expedition, on the 
same lines urging him to invade Ashanti from its r e a r , 39
Ramseyer's hopes and expectations were not fu lf i l le d . Scott's and the 
Governor's attempts to turn the expedition into an invasion of Ashanti were 
vetoed by the Secretary o f State, But Ramseyer was not discouraged. He carried 
on his figh t for the overthrow o f Ashanti to London, where he enlisted the support 
of Lord W olseley, the ‘conqueror’ o f Ashanti. In his le tte r to Wolseley, he 
emphasized those points about Ashanti which he knew would find the greatest 
response in the veteran soldier who, Ramseyer hoped, would influence the 
British Government in favour o f his own wishes. He tried to arouse Wolseley's 
sympathies w ith  lurid accounts of Ashant: activities in Nkoranza during the
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recent war. The Ashanti, he wrote, had attacked Nkoranza because the latter 
had refused to pay tribute 'in slaves', had burnt Nkoranza towns and taken 
2,000 'women' and 'children' captive. For effect, he resorted to exaggeration: 
he alleged that the whole of Ashanti (the larger part of which had, in fact, 
sent contingents to fight the Nkoranza) 'with the exception of Coomassie with 
very few towns' were expecting to see the English Government bring their law 
and make peace reign in the country and were 'astonished' that this had not 
happened. He appealed to the general prejudice against Ashanti: the Ashanti-
hene, he said, had in consequence of Scott's withdrawal from Atebubu without 
striking a blow, 'become more impudent than ev e r'. He appealed to the general 
dislike for a futile disbursement of funds; in spite of the English Government's 
expenses on Scott's expedition, he said, the 'bloodthirsty' King of Ashanti had 
been left to 'trouble' the country and because of the futility of the expedition the 
'adherents' of the colonial government had been placed in a 'dilemma', wondering 
whether to leave the country or submit to Ashanti. He even appealed to the 
Englishman's pridej English prestige, he said, had suffered a blow as the result 
of Scott's abortive campaign and the result was constant 'quarrels' and 'troubles' 
in the interior. Finally he appealed to Wolseley's conscience and to English 
economic interests: the Ashanti, he asserted, were continuing 'human sacrifices'
which they had undertaken by the Treaty of Fomena to abolish; they had shut up 
the country for educational and commercial purposes, the King refusing t6 allow  
schools to be opened. Almost as an afterthought, he averred that his 'sole desire' 
was that the Ashanti should receive the blessings of mission work.
Finally from Neuchatel in Switzerland, he wrote to the Colonial Office  
enclosing a letter from his missionary colleague, the Reverend Perregaux at Abetifi 
in which the latter gives a 'pitiful description' of what was going on in the Ashanti 
country .^1
Such was the measure of Ramseyer's contribution to the destruction of Ashanti' 
independence. He was in good company in supposing that the Ashanti had to be 
forced'to progress. He was, almost certainly, genuinely concerned about the 'soul' 
of the Ashanti and convinced that their 'progress'-educationa!, religious,economic' 
could only be achieved within the colonial framework.
This may account for the vigour of his campaign for the overthrow of Ashanti. 
In this campaign, he sometimes showed scant regard for the fadts , showed himself
ARTICLES 12.
too credulous and resorted to the spy's tactics, and, in his role as the advocate 
of all the centrifugal tendencies within the Ashanti kingdom, he would have 
been regarded as an enemy of the Ashanti state if the King had known of his 
activities, it seems a fair assessment that Ramseyer typifies that sort of 
missionary who, in his ignorance of the meaning of foreign cultures and In 
his Sack of sympathy for native political aspirations became the colonialist 
agent par excellence. Finally, it may be the case that the conquesi or 
continued existence of Ashanti was the test of Ramseyer's faith in God. It 
would be recalled that he had foretold God's judgment and chastisement of 
Ashanti for her misdeeds/including the capture of Ramseyer.
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